The surprise attack by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which began on November 27, 2024, and resulted in the fall of Damascus in less than two weeks, caught many by surprise\u2014including President Bashar al-Assad, who fled the city on December 7, 2024. Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has so far adopted a pragmatic approach as he seeks to build a new Syria. His vision focuses on creating an inclusive Syrian National Project that aims to guarantee the rights and place of Syria\u2019s diverse ethnic and ideological groups. While this new vision aligns with that of moderate regional partners, the challenges ahead remain immense. A series of ethnic clashes\u2014resulting in two massacres, one in the coastal Alawite region and another targeting the Druze community\u2014raises questions about the ability of the new government to implement a transformed Syria.<\/p>\n
Success means creating a power-sharing model, which is the only way to potentially gain the support of most Syrians. But not all seek to share power, and many still doubt the leadership of a former jihadist now backed by Islamists. Six months after Assad\u2019s fall, Israel bombed the new government palace in Damascus for the first time, sending a signal to the new Syrian government that it had not done enough to prevent a massacre in the Druze areas of Damascus. As Israel assesses whether the new Syrian administration is a potential ally or a new enemy, there may still be time to engage with those in Syria committed to building a different future for the country.<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Despite his short time on the throne, the reign of Sultan Selim in the 16th century is notable for the significant expansion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1514, Selim I, leading the Ottomans and defending Sunni orthodoxy, emerged victorious at the Battle of Chaldiran against the Shiite Safavids. Two years later, in 1516, Sultan Selim I conquered Syria after a swift campaign; the territory would remain an Ottoman possession for more than 400 years. Following the victorious Chaldiran battle, Selim I turned his forces southward in the Ottoman\u2013Mamluk War, defeating the Mamluks in Syria. He entered Damascus in mid-October 1517 and continued on to Egypt (although, at the time, white Toyota pickups were unavailable). Still, his swift victory was achieved in part by his artillery.[1]<\/a> Indeed, Selim I conquered the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, expanding the empire from Syria and Palestine to the Hejaz and Tihamah regions in the Arabian Peninsula. Five hundred years later\u2014and about a century after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire\u2014it appears that Damascus is again in the hands of the (neo)-Ottomans, or at least a neo-Ottoman proxy. Is this the beginning of a new Pax Ottomana<\/em> in the Middle East? Or might this be another short chapter in the bloody Syrian conflict? More importantly, what are the ramifications of these new dynamics for Syria and Israel, as well as the broader regional agenda?<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The HTS surprise attack that began on November 27, 2024, and resulted in the capture of Damascus in less than two weeks caught many off guard\u2014including President Bashar al-Assad himself, who fled the city on December 7, 2024. Syria, a divided country that had not yet recovered from the \u201cSyrian Spring\u201d\u2014which evolved into a civil war, a proxy conflict, and an interregional battleground\u2014now finds itself under a new ruler, seated in the Mount Mazzeh Palace in Damascus. Nevertheless, the deep-rooted problems still remain.<\/p>\n Ahmed al-Sharaa has thus far taken a pragmatic approach. He has outlined his vision for the new Syrian project, stating, \u201cThe Syrian population has lived together for thousands of years.\u201d[2]<\/a> Moreover, he added, \u201cWe will have dialogue and ensure everyone is represented.\u201d Criticizing the previous regime, he remarked that it always played with sectarian divisions, \u201cbut we will not\u2026 I think the revolution can contain everybody.\u201d These ideas are pivotal for the success of the Syrian National Project that al-Sharaa seeks to create. However, they also hint at the challenge that lies ahead in reuniting a deeply divided country that has still not recovered from a sectarian war.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Between Old Divisions and a New Syrian Project<\/strong><\/p>\n Syria is home to a mosaic of ethnic groups. While the majority of the population is Arab and Sunni\u2014comprising over 70% of the country\u2019s pre-war population\u2014Syria also includes significant Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian populations. The Kurds, primarily in the northeastern regions, have their own distinct languages and cultures. The Armenian community, many of whom are descendants of survivors of the Armenian Genocide, is concentrated in several urban centers. Assyrians, an ancient ethnic group, also reside in the northeast. Other minorities, such as Alawites, Druze, and Turkmen, further add to the country\u2019s ethnic complexity. Under the rule of the Assad family, the Alawites\u2014consisting of roughly 12% of Syria\u2019s pre-war population\u2014adopted a strategy of co-opting other minority groups, realizing that to rule over a Sunni Arab majority, they required allies. However, the protracted war drastically altered Syria\u2019s demographic composition. The majority of those killed\u2014over 600,000 according to many estimates and close to a million according to some\u2014were Sunni Muslims.[3]<\/a> Similarly, the refugees who left Syria beginning in 2011, estimated to be around 14 million out of the 23 million pre-war population, were also primarily Sunni Muslims.[4]<\/a> Now, with the power dynamics having shifted, some fear it is also time for revenge.<\/p>\n Unfortunately, Syria\u2019s divisions do not end with ethnic or religious tensions. The conflict\u2014an all-out civil, ethnic, and proxy war that has tarnished Syria since 2012\u2014has created additional divisions that have quickly giving rise to armed groups with local, regional, or ideological agendas, adding a new dimension of seam lines. While most ethnic groups\u2014specifically the Kurds, the Druze, and the Alawites (who until recently controlled the Syrian military)\u2014have significant fighting forces, other forces also operate on the ground. HTS, the Turkish-backed Islamic rebels who have taken Damascus and formed a new government, was established in 2017 as a merger of several armed factions, including Jaysh al-Ahrar, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham\u00a0(JFS),\u00a0Ansar al-Din Front,\u00a0Jaysh al-Sunna,\u00a0Liwa al-Haqq, and others. This is not a unified military force, and its commander, Ahmed al-Sharaa, may in fact become a target for assassination by his rivals. Alleged intelligence reports claim that a clandestine IRGC operation is aimed at assassinating al-Sharaa in order for Tehran to regain influence over Damascus.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n These tensions have already manifested in a series of ethnic clashes, with two major violent events targeting minority communities.<\/p>\n Salafi-jihadi groups (ideologically close to ISIS) continue to be active in Syria, and some are conducting extrajudicial killings against Syrians perceived to be tied to the former al-Assad regime. One group\u2014Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah\u2014called for the killing of an Assad informant in Aleppo in April 2025 and has already claimed several killings. The group has carried out dozens of attacks targeting former Assad officials and the Alawite minority in western Syria and has also announced that it will attack the Druze community in southwestern Suwayda Province.[7]<\/a> While the government seeks to collect weapons and merge the various armed groups into a unified Syrian Security Force, the continued existence of independent armed groups remains a significant challenge and fuels additional clashes between the Syrian government and its own citizens.<\/p>\n Sectarianism has consistently exacerbated tensions in Syria, undermining efforts to build a cohesive political society. As Saghieh notes, historical narratives often categorize communities along rigid lines\u2014Arabs and non-Arabs, Muslim mawla <\/em>(subjects) and non-Muslim dhimmis<\/em>\u2014while urban spaces are divided into Jewish and Christian quarters, and mountainous regions into Alawite and Druze enclaves. This entrenched fragmentation has long hindered the development of an inclusive national identity. Although the ambitions of regional powers like Turkey and Iran further complicate the path to stability, a truly constructive strategy must prioritize addressing Syria\u2019s deep-rooted sectarian and ethnic divisions. In this regard, the federalist structure introduced during the French Mandate offers valuable historical insights. By revisiting and adapting this model, Syria can foster national unity while respecting its diverse social fabric\u2014paving the way for a more harmonious and resilient future.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n A New Syrian National Project?<\/strong><\/p>\n In a recent party speech, Turkish President Erdo\u011fan talked openly about his ambitions to \u201crevise the outcome of World War I and annex Syrian territories (formerly Ottoman provinces) into Turkey.\u201d Contrary to Western Europe, where a post-modern and post-nationalist mindset still dominates elite circles, much of the world is shifting toward a neo-imperialist mindset.<\/p>\n Turkey supports and trains the Syrian National Army (al-jaysh al-watani<\/em>),[9]<\/a> an offshoot of the Free Syrian Army that began its activities in Syria in 2017 with Turkish backing. This faction consists of over 30 armed groups that do not necessarily operate under a unified command. Other factions of the Free Syrian Army\u2014mainly secular groups that rejected Turkish patronage\u2014are spread throughout Syria and beyond, receiving support from various parties, including the United States and Gulf nations. A statement released on December 24, 2024, regarding an agreement with the leaders of former rebel factions to dissolve and consolidate all groups under a new Syrian Defense Ministry is undoubtedly promising but also revealing. Many armed groups have resisted surrendering their weapons,[10]<\/a> either due to ideological differences or out of fear for their safety. Some of these groups are aligned with political factions that do not recognize the al-Sharaa-led Syrian National Project. The recent armed clashes in Syria reflect both the challenges and dangers that lie ahead. If the Syrian National Project fails\u2014or if a formula cannot be developed to unite the country\u2019s diverse religious, tribal, ideological, and ethnic groups into an effective power-sharing arrangement\u2014Syria may face further fragmentation. This could prolong the violence and ultimately threaten to plunge the country back into turmoil.<\/p>\n If and when Syria is able to overcome its divisions, herculean efforts will be needed to achieve statehood. In 1918, German sociologist Max Weber defined the state as a \u201chuman community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.\u201d[11]<\/a> This state monopoly on violence is widely regarded as a defining characteristic of the modern state.[12]<\/a> It has been reported that the new Syrian regime aspires to form a 300,000-strong army<\/a> with the help of Turkey within a year and a half, with Turkish military advisors playing a central role. Turkish Armed Forces personnel would oversee the process at five strategic locations.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n While Syria\u2019s new rulers have called for the disbanding of all armed groups, few have complied. Fighters from the Druze religious minority say they prefer to rely on their own men rather than the promises made by Syria\u2019s transitional authorities.[14]<\/a> The Kurds, too, will be among the last to trust a Turkish-backed effort\u2014and especially so will the secular groups, which the West has formally backed.<\/p>\n On March 29, 2025, President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced the formation of a 23-member transitional cabinet. Under the new interim constitution, the position of prime minister was eliminated, consolidating executive authority within the presidency. Key cabinet appointments include Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qusra, Interior Minister Anas Khattab, and Finance Minister Mohammed Yisr Barnieh. Hind Kabawat, the sole female minister and a Christian, was appointed to oversee the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, signaling an effort toward greater inclusivity. While al-Sharaa declared at the ceremony marking the new cabinet\u2019s appointment that \u201cwe witness the birth of a new phase of our national journey,\u201d the new cabinet has drawn significant criticism. The concentration of power in the hands of the president and the absence of a prime minister have raised fears of potential authoritarianism and the marginalization of diverse political voices. Although the government has taken steps to promote inclusivity by appointing ministers from various ethnic and religious backgrounds, persistent sectarian tensions and the limited representation of women continue to fuel concerns about the depth and sincerity of these reforms.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Challenges and Opportunities for Israel <\/strong><\/p>\n Israel has thus far gained from these rapid changes, mainly because the new Sunni\u2013Turkish-led camp has made it a priority to push the Iranian Shiite axis out of Syria. Whereas in the past, Israel viewed the strength of Arab states as a primary threat\u2014and later, their fragmentation and weakness as a source of instability\u2014today, Israel appears to be leveraging these very weaknesses to serve its interests. Since the fall of Assad, Israel\u2019s approach to Syria has been shaped through a security lens, influenced by the trauma of October 7, 2023. That response has included seizing control of a demilitarized buffer zone established under the 1974 ceasefire agreement that encompasses areas on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon; launching an intense series of airstrikes on Syrian military sites; conducting raids in Damascus; and announcing alliances with some of Syria\u2019s minorities. Israel stated that the new government is led by \u201ca jihadist terrorist of the al-Qaeda school\u201d[16]<\/a>\u2014a message echoed by Iran\u2014which has raised questions about Israel\u2019s willingness to consider a shift in its relations with Syria.<\/p>\n In parallel, Israel announced a \u201cminority engagement\u201d policy, forging closer ties with groups like the Kurds and the Druze,[17]<\/a> who share similar concerns about the rise of Islamist forces in the region and fear for their security.[18]<\/a> Israel has promised to support the Kurds and protect the Druze through military means if necessary, a policy that positions Israel as a partisan actor in the middle of Syria\u2019s internal conflicts and at odds with the country\u2019s Sunni majority-led government.<\/p>\n Israel fears that the influence of Turkey and Qatar\u2014both linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which won 22% of the votes in the Jordanian elections in September 2024\u2014offers a potential new axis of anti-Israel forces. The jihadist background and affiliations of Ahmed al-Sharaa, and even more so of some of the appointed figures such as Anas Khattab, who also appears on the American Terror list due to his links with ISIS under Abu Musab al Zarqawi,[19]<\/a> do little to ease Israeli concerns. These concerns are reflected in ongoing IDF activities in the buffer zone (UNDOF AOS) situated in the Syrian Golan Heights plateau, which Israel controls, and beyond.<\/p>\n Prime Minister Netanyahu declared that \u201cwe have no intention of interfering in Syria\u2019s internal affairs, but we intend to do what is necessary to ensure our security,\u201d adding that he authorized the Israel Air Force to \u201cbomb strategic military capabilities left behind by the Syrian army so that they would not fall into the hands of the jihadists.\u201d[20]<\/a><\/p>\n This, however, should be seen as a temporary move, as it does not address the pivotal policy questions Israel must consider when it comes to Syria. While a military force might address immediate security concerns, longer-term prospects for relations require consideration of other policy options. The current Israeli presence in Syria\u2014which is already viewed as an \u201coccupation\u201d\u2014has triggered demonstrations and hostile activities against Israel, which, in turn, have provoked Israeli responses resulting in the deaths of multiple unarmed Syrian civilians.[21]<\/a> Although Israel has so far remained largely peripheral to the evolving dynamics within Syria, its continued military activity in the Golan Heights risks shifting that perception\u2014potentially redirecting some of the Syrian public\u2019s anger toward Israel itself.<\/p>\n Israel should act wisely with the local Syrian communities. In a significant development, approximately 60 Druze clerics from Syria were permitted to cross into Israel on March 14, 2025, to partake in a pilgrimage. This marked the first such visit since 1948, allowing Syrian and Israeli Druze to reunite and pray together at the sacred site of Nabi Shuaib in the Lower Galilee. The Syrian Druze clergy were welcomed by hundreds of members of the Israeli Druze community at the Nabi Shuaib shrine compound.[22]<\/a> On April 25, 2025, 650 Druze clerics crossed the Syria border into Israel for an overnight visit to celebrate the holiday of Ziyara at the tomb of Nabi Shuaib, marking the second such visit since longtime Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad was ousted in December. Participants hoped ties \u201cwon\u2019t be cut off,\u201d and many hailed the events as \u201chistoric,\u201d with some meeting relatives for the first time.[23]<\/a> However, this renewed bond\u2014and Israel\u2019s promise to \u201cprotect the Druze\u201d in Syria\u2014has also drawn Israel further into the Syrian cauldron and opened a new front vis-\u00e0-vis the new Syrian government.<\/p>\n Since Hamas\u2019s surprise attack on October 7, 2023, Israel\u2019s active fronts with its adversaries have triggered tectonic shifts across the region. The emerging reality with Syria demands new tools and strategies to navigate effectively. Jonathan Adiri reminded us that Israel continues to embrace \u201cthe villa in the jungle\u201d mindset\u2014a phrase coined by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and adopted by his successors\u2014that frames the region primarily through the lens of military threat suppression rather than through a proactive vision of a desired future. This approach misses the opportunity for sophisticated engagement with regional powers such as Syria, as well as Lebanon or Turkey, and others. Israel should abandon this outdated paradigm and adopt a broad, regional strategy built on strategic alliances.[24]<\/a> As opportunities increase with the weakening of Iran and its destabilizing axis, Israel should equally be willing to take more calculated \u00a0risks with its neighbors if it seeks a different trajectory toward a more stable future.<\/p>\n Syria, once a cornerstone of the Middle East, has been plunged into turmoil since the outbreak of civil war in 2011. Today, the country remains fragmented, its cities in ruins, and its economy devastated. Israel has often viewed Syria solely through the narrow lens of security interests associated with its former alliance with radical Sunni elements and with Iran. However, as Syria seeks to rebuild, it may be time to reconsider this approach. Rather than seeing Syria merely as a battleground or a pawn on a wider geopolitical chessboard, Israel and its neighbors should recognize the potential for Syria\u2019s renaissance and assist the forces that seek to build a different Syrian national project.<\/p>\n As Israel\u2019s neighbor, Syria holds the potential to evolve in two different directions: it could reemerge as a renewed adversary, aligned with a hostile Sunni axis led by Turkey and Qatar, or reposition itself as a more conservative actor, offering a novel model for inclusive and stable power-sharing in the region. In light of this uncertainty, Israel should move beyond the binary framework that views Syria solely through the lens of either the Iran-led Shiite axis or a radical Sunni bloc. Instead, it should explore opportunities for alignment with Syrian actors striving for a moderate and independent national vision.<\/p>\n One such figure is Ahmed al-Sharaa\u2014also known as al-Julani, a reference to his family\u2019s roots in the Golan Heights and his early presence there. A former jihadist, al-Sharaa now stands at a crossroads: He could either be pulled back toward his militant origins or be encouraged to continue his pivot toward moderation and pragmatism. The question remains whether al-Sharaa can evolve into a leader capable of forging a new kind of bridge between Syria and Israel.<\/p>\n Syria\u2014historically a vital crossroads along the Via Maris, the ancient trade route linking Mesopotamia and Egypt\u2014has once again become a geopolitical flashpoint. A thoughtful and measured Israeli policy could help transform this contested space into a corridor for regional reconciliation. Conversely, miscalculation or aggressive posturing risks reawakening the dormant tensions and igniting another chapter of destructive sectarian conflict.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Jean-Pierre Rageau and G\u00e9rard Chaliand, G\u00e9opolitique des Empires<\/em> (Roubaix, Flammarion edition, 2023), 99.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> \u201cSyria not a Threat to the World, HTS Leader Ahmed al-Sharaa Tells BBC,\u201d BBC<\/em>, December 19, 2024, www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c05p9g2nqmeo<\/a><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Aryn Baker, \u201cHow Many People Have Died in Syria\u2019s Civil War?\u201d New York Times<\/em>, December 11, 2024, www.nytimes.com\/2024\/12\/11\/world\/middleeast\/syria-civil-war-death-toll.html<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> UNHCR, \u201cSyria Refugee Crisis Explained,\u201d December 23, 2024, https:\/\/www.unrefugees.org\/news\/syria-refugee-crisis-explained\/<\/a><\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Mehdi Oghbai, \u201cMultiple Reports Reveal Tehran\u2019s Covert Assassination Plot Against Syrian Leader,\u201d National Council of Resistance of Iran, February 11, 2025, https:\/\/www.ncr-iran.org\/en\/news\/terrorism-a-fundamentalism\/iran-news-multiple-reports-reveal-tehrans-covert-assassination-plot-against-syrian-leader\/<\/a><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Nurit Yohanan and Emanuel Fabian, \u201cIsrael Strikes Target Near Damascus Presidential Palace in \u2018Message to Syrian Regime,\u2019\u201d Times of Israel<\/em>, May 2, 2025, https:\/\/www.msn.com\/en-us\/news\/world\/israel-strikes-target-near-damascus-presidential-palace-in-message-to-syrian-regime\/ar-AA1E1LuU<\/a><\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter, \u201cIran Update,\u201d Institute for the Study of War, April 23, 2025, https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/backgrounder\/iran-update-april-23-2025<\/a><\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Hazem Saghieh, \u201cBut It\u2019s Sectarianism\u2026 Isn\u2019t It?,\u201d Asharq Al-Awsat<\/em>, December 30, 2024, https:\/\/english.aawsat.com\/opinion\/5096581-it%E2%80%99s-sectarianism-isnt-it<\/a><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> \u201cSyrian National Army (SNA),\u201d Global Security, https:\/\/www.globalsecurity.org\/military\/world\/para\/sna.htm#google_vignette<\/a><\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, \u201cRefusing to Surrender Seized Weapons, Clashes Erupt Between Military Operations and Armed Group in Homs,\u201d December 22, 2024, https:\/\/www.syriahr.com\/en\/351952\/<\/a><\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Max Weber, \u201cPolitics as a Vocation,\u201d in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology<\/em>, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (Routledge, 1970), 77\u2013128.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Andr\u00e9 Munro, \u201cState Monopoly on Violence,\u201d Encyclopedia Britannica<\/em>, March 6, 2013, https:\/\/www.britannica.com\/topic\/state-monopoly-on-violence<\/a><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Turkish Minute, \u201cSyria to Form a 300,000-Strong Army With Turkey\u2019s Support: Report,\u201d December 24, 2024, https:\/\/www.turkishminute.com\/2024\/12\/24\/syria-to-form-300000-strong-army-with-turkeys-support-report\/<\/a><\/p>\n [14]<\/a> France 24, \u201cSyrian Druze Brigade Reluctant to Give Up Their Arms in Uncertain Times,\u201d December 24, 2024, https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/middle-east\/20241224-syrian-druze-brigade-reluctant-to-give-up-their-arms-in-uncertain-times<\/a><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Loveday Morris, \u201cSyria Announces a New Transitional Government,\u201d Washington Post<\/em>, March 29, 2025, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2025\/03\/29\/syria-al-sharaa-cabinet\/<\/a><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> \u00a0Itay Blumental, \u201cMinister Katz on the Riots in Syria: Julani is a Jihadist Terrorist,\u201d Kan News<\/em>, March 7, 2025 [Hebrew], https:\/\/www.kan.org.il\/content\/kan-news\/defense\/868220\/<\/a><\/p>\n [17]<\/a> \u201cDoes Israel Have a Strategy in Syria? \u201c We Need to Engage in Dialogue with al-Julani; He is the Lesser Evil,\u201d Ynet<\/em>, March 28, 2025 [Hebrew], https:\/\/www.ynet.co.il\/news\/article\/bytmkqpsye<\/a><\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Omri Haim, \u201cBegging for Israel to Intervene: Voices of Minorities in Syria, Under the New Regime,\u201d Channel 14, March 4, 2025 [Hebrew], https:\/\/www.c14.co.il\/article\/1137192 <\/a><\/p>\n [19]<\/a>United Nations Security Council, \u201cAnas Hasan Khattab,\u201d https:\/\/main.un.org\/securitycouncil\/en\/sanctions\/1267\/aq_sanctions_list\/summaries\/individual\/anas-hasan-khattab<\/a><\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Moran Azulay, \u201cNetanyahu at Defense HQ: \u2018Interested in Relations With New Syrian Regime,\u2019\u201d Ynet<\/em>, October 12, 2024, https:\/\/www.ynetnews.com\/article\/r1wjegu4jl<\/a><\/p>\n [21]<\/a> Mostafa Salem and Eyad Kourdi, \u201cFifteen Killed in Israeli Strikes on Damascus, Syria State Media Say,\u201d CNN<\/em>, November 16, 2024, https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2024\/11\/14\/middleeast\/israeli-strikes-damascus-syria-intl<\/a><\/p>\n [22]<\/a> Syriac Press, \u201cFor the First Time in Decades, Syrian Druze Clergy Travel to Israel for Pilgrimage,\u201d March 15, 2025, https:\/\/syriacpress.com\/blog\/2025\/03\/15\/for-the-first-time-in-decades-syrian-druze-clergy-travel-to-israel-for-pilgrimage\/<\/a><\/p>\n [23]<\/a> \u201cIsraeli, Syrian Relatives Reunite as 650 Druze Clerics Visit Israel for 2-Day Pilgrimage,\u201d Times of Israel<\/em>, April 27, 2025, https:\/\/www.timesofisrael.com\/israeli-syrian-relatives-reunite-as-650-druze-clerics-visit-israel-for-2-day-pilgrimage\/<\/a><\/p>\n [24]<\/a> Jonathan Adiri, \u201cIsrael\u2019s Failed Policies End Its Special Status in DC: All Roads to Washington No Longer Pass Through Jerusalem,\u201d Ynet<\/em>, April 23, 2025, https:\/\/www.ynetnews.com\/article\/byaepbiyee<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The surprise attack by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which began on November 27, 2024, and resulted in the fall of Damascus in less than two weeks, caught many by surprise\u2014including […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[36],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4878","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-feed"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4878","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4878"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4878\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4878"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4878"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rlgslsb.haifa.ac.il\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4878"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n